The Productivity Commission has put out a paper calling for submissions on Urban Planning, here. It’s a very wide ranging, going right back to first principles where they have discovered that:
Yet even among planners, there appears to be no agreed definition of “planning” or “urban planning”, and writers have struggled with whether a definition can be provided.
Despite this lack of theoretical certainty I think we all know urban planning when we see it, or perhaps more accurately its outcomes. Pleasingly the paper begins with a short history of Petone which is used to illustrate the accretive and accidental nature of city forming:
The changing nature of urban areas
Urban areas are dynamic, complex places. Land uses and neighbourhoods can change dramatically in response to economic, technological and demographic forces.
One example of this evolution comes from Easterly, Freschi and Pennings (2015), who explored how a single stretch of a New York City street changed over four centuries of development. Easterly, Freschi and Pennings concluded that it is “difficult for prescriptive planners to anticipate changes in comparative advantage, and it is easy for regulations to stifle creative destruction and to create misallocation.” (p. 1)
The town of Petone in Lower Hutt illustrates the diversity of influences that shape urban areas. [Below] provides an outline of its history, although inevitably many important details and events are overlooked. The transition of Petone – from a Māori village, to the intended site of a major colonial settlement, to a working-class industrial area, a run-down town, at various times a retail destination, and a desirable residential neighbourhood – show how unpredictable the evolution of our urban areas can be.
Given this surely accurate observation, shouldn’t any attempts at controlling the form of our cities in fact shy away from control but instead aim for incentivisation? Won’t nudging the direction of individual impulses be likely to be more effective that prescriptive programmes? And much less likely to result in unwanted unintended consequences, like out of control dwelling inflation. After all it appears that even the most egregious of city ordinances are well meant, no matter how much damage they do either indirectly or to other aims. And city building is full of contradictory impulses; for example nothing allows more retention [if not preservation] of older building than economic stagnation, yet surely it is fair to say there are few if any councils that would consciously pursue policies of economic ruin in order to bolster their worthy desire to preserve their city’s built fabric?
Another example is the whole history of auto-priority of the last 60 years across the developed world; so often expensive road and parking infrastructure was built with the very aim of reviving or maintaining the economic life of places, yes these investments simply reinforced their decline and unsuitability of these places for the brave new world of driving focussed city. For example Auckland’s City Centre only really began to recover from the flight of the motorway/sprawl era once Minimum Parking Regs were inverted- replaced with Maximums instead. Thereby nudging development and use of the city towards walkable proximate-focussed more intense land use. In fact MPRs must rank very high up the list of the most destructive yet well meant influences on city development, see this disastrous example from the sadly much governance-abused city of Christchurch; so prioritising ease of parking that the actual destination become untenable and disappears. Mandated parking oversupply is a form of urban self-harm so ubiquitous in mediocre conurbations that it’s become invisible: it’s the teenage cutting of city-management.
The question next becomes what scale of nudge is required to incentivise more productive city building and city using; nudge or shove? Denmark for example, has a 180% tax on new cars and one the highest bicycle usage rates in the world. These two things are surely not unrelated [see here for context, however]. Japan, Singapore, and Hong Kong all have the most widespread and financially successful urban, and in Japan’s case, inter city, Transit networks and all also have significant barriers to car ownership and use, as well as planning rules that enable more efficient land use. See here.
Here is the ProdComm’s quick history of the urban development of Petone:
The evolution of Petone
Prior to European settlement there was a large Te Āti Awa Pa at Pito-one. The New Zealand Company’s surveyor, Captain William Mein Smith chose the Heretaunga (Hutt) river valley for the site of their planned settlement “Britannia”, and the Company ships began arriving in January 1840. Relations between Māori and the settlers were positive in large part due to the hospitality and mana of local chief Te Puni. The grid street plan drawn up in England was soon abandoned. In March the river flooded the settlement, and a fire and earthquake followed in May. Britannia was largely abandoned by the end of 1840, with the settlers having moved to Pipitea/Thorndon, which Colonel Wakefield had long favoured for the settlement.
In 1847 there were probably no more than 20 settler households left, and it remained almost wholly deserted until 1875. The land was poor quality for grazing, and the Hutt River flooded at least annually. Pito-one Pa, with a population of 136, remained the largest and best-fortified pa in the Wellington area. In 1855 a major earthquake lifted the area, draining a portion of the lower valley.
In 1874 the Wellington-Wairarapa train line opened. A large railway workshop was built in Petone. That same year a butcher, James Gear, began to purchase and lease land around the Petone foreshore for a slaughterhouse. It was attractive for the cheap flat land, proximity to the harbour and railway line, and the small size of the local population to be offended by the waste and smell of the facility. In 1883 the company built a 380m long wharf, demolished in 1901. A large wool mill was established in 1886.
Petone grew rapidly, and was gazetted as a town in 1881. A series of factories and breweries were built. Schools, churches, newspapers, sports and social clubs were established in the 1880s, many of which survive today.
A local farmer, Edwin Jackson, sold portions of his land piecemeal with unsurveyed rights- of-way. The result was that by 1885 there was local concern that Jackson Street was an embarrassing series of dog-legs, of varying width along its length. Jackson Street was extended when the land was bought by the borough solicitor on behalf of the Crown in 1888. Blood and offal went straight into the harbour, attracting sharks, so Jackson built a swimming bath near the waterfront. Plans for a gasworks were abandoned in 1897, and the land that had been earmarked for this use was purchased by the council as a recreation ground. But the council declined to buy Jackson’s baths, and a ratepayers poll in 1901 also decided against a purchase, so they were closed.
By the early 1900s Jackson Street was the hub of Hutt Valley commercial activity, with notable stores such as McKenzies, McDuffs and Liebezeits. The Grand Theatre opened in 1916. But Jackson Street’s haphazard alignment was still a problem and between 1927 and 1938 the council widened and straightened Jackson Street, with buildings shifted back on rails or demolished.
New Zealand’s earliest state houses were built in Patrick Street from 1906, although they were sold in the 1930s. Council chambers were built in 1903 and a town clock in 1913. A new wharf was constructed in 1907. Industrialisation continued: Lever Brothers factory opened in 1919, Sunlight Factory in 1924, and a number of car plants in the 1920s and 1930s. Three out of every four cars in New Zealand were said to come from Petone up until the 1950s. The town produced many successful sportspeople and the Petone Rugby Club numerous All Blacks.
Petone, by local standards, was densely populated and heavily industrialised, ugly, grimy, lively and close-knit, more like an English industrial town than a New Zealand one. (Butterworth, 1988, p. 13)
But from the 1950s the area began to decline, as some industries closed and residents moved to the new suburbs of the Hutt Valley. A number of state housing flats were built from the 1950s to the 1970s on the eastern part of Jackson Street. The Borough Council designated an area north of Jackson Street as an industrial zone, and
[t]he result of this was that no one was allowed to improve their properties, which meant many fell into disrepair and were sold off to developers. It was impossible for young Petone people to get a loan to buy property in their hometown so many left for Wainuiomata or Upper Hutt. The town become a place of rented properties owned by absentee landlords. By the mid seventies and eighties Jackson Street was pretty much derelict. (Johnston, 2015, pp. 93-95)
The Council proposed building a ring road around central Jackson Street, to create a mall in the centre of town at a cost of $10 million and the demolition of 80 houses. But significant local opposition stopped the project, and many councillors were voted out.
Petone wharf took its last cargo in 1976. The Gear meatworks closed in 1981. Long- established stores closed and the council chambers were demolished in 1986. Deregulation of the New Zealand economy resulted in many of the remaining factories closing. Developers who were demolishing and rebuilding in Wellington regarded Jackson Street as a place of little commercial potential, so its old buildings were left untended. In turn, “this stagnation ironically preserved the historic CBD as a desirable social and economic centre” (Johnston, 2015, p. 177). Petone recovered in the 1990s as industrial land uses gave way to big box retailing in the west of Jackson Street. Petone again became a retail destination, and this benefited the smaller shops along Jackson Street. A burgeoning bar, café, gallery, and retail sector followed. In 1996 the Historic Places Trust recognised Jackson Street as an Historic Area, but this had no regulatory force. There were a number of battles between local heritage groups, developers and the council over the next decade.
The “character homes” of Petone and its proximity and transport links to Wellington made Petone a desirable residential neighbourhood. A number of apartments were built or converted, consistent with council design guidelines. In 2014 it was announced that many of the state housing flats on the eastern part of Jackson Street were to be demolished, but the Patrick Street cottages survive and are protected. The Grand Theatre, which closed in 1964, was used as an electrical shop, furniture business, and in the 1990s was converted to an apartment complex with boutique shops below. Today, the site of the Gear meatworks is a supermarket, and Petone wharf is a popular fishing location, with fewer sharks than in the past.
Source: Butterworth, 1988; Johnston, 1999, 2009, 2015.
Apartments, tower cranes, and the coming new cycling/walking amenity right in the heart of the city’s motorway singularity.
If you live in the North West and were looking forward to the end of what has now been over five years of constant road works along the Northwestern Motorway – which started with Lincoln Rd back in October 2010 – then don’t get your hopes up for the disruption ending any time soon. The NZTA are now starting to once again talking about the section they’ve so far missed in their grand widening schemes – the bit between Lincoln Rd and Westgate. What’s more despite being silent on the project for so long they’re now talking about starting the $100+ million widening project in little over six months with work expected to take till 2019 to complete.
The NZTA say the project involves
- Widening the motorway to create 3 lanes in both directions for motorists
- Creating bus shoulder lanes next to the motorway in both directions
- Extending the Northwestern Cycleway to create a 3-metre wide shared walking and cycling path from Lincoln Road to Westgate
- Improving the Royal Road interchange and ramps. Replacing, raising and widening Royal Road Bridge, creating an on-road cycle lane, shared walking and cycling path, and new footpath
- Replacing and raising Huruhuru Road Bridge
- Extending the Lincoln Road on-ramp heading westbound and replacing one side of the bridge over Huruhuru Creek
- New landscaping, urban design and lighting features
- New wetlands to treat stormwater run-off
- Improved safety barriers and new noise walls.
I’m not necessarily opposed to the project as there are some useful aspects to it but it does seem to have the typical motorway building approach to it – that being to widen everything around this section thereby increasing the justification for to spend a heap of money ‘fixing’ on the newly created bottleneck.
Probably the most useful aspect of the project for me personally and one I’m very keen to see built is the cycleway. Normally cycleways alongside motorways aren’t great however in this situation the motorway has a shallower grade than the surrounding streets do so will be a welcome addition. That brings me to my first issue/concern. The map above shows the cycleway veering off with the motorway ramps to Makora Rd which is steep and quite narrow. As Royal Rd is on a ridgeline it means that diversion adds additional height for those on bikes (or walking) to deal with. I’d prefer to see the cycleway pass under the offramp and then stick to the level of the motorway – obviously with a connection to Royal Rd. The diversion also adds at least two sets of traffic lights that need to be negotiated.
An issue perhaps even more important is the situation for buses. The NZTA are only building bus shoulder lanes in the project. While bus shoulder lanes are better than nothing it ignores that Auckland Transport want a full busway built on this section – although AT acknowledged in the West Auckland New Network consultation that bus shoulder lanes would go in first.
What it all means is that AT will still have to build a busway separately at some point in the future at a much larger cost rather than the NZTA taking the One Network approach they love to talk about these days. It also highlights another inconsistency the NZTA run with. You may recall in the debate before the current works were started we and others called for a busway along SH16. At the time the NZTA hid behind the then Auckland Regional Council’s Regional Land Transport Strategy (RLTS) which only suggested bus lanes alongside the motorway. That’s not the same situation with this section though as the route from Lincoln Rd to Westgate and beyond were included as part of a possible future Rapid Transit route between Henderson and Constellation Drive.
One aspect I am a little surprised about is that the NZTA are only going to upgrade the interchange as it is and that they’re not going to add north facing ramps.
As part of this now rapidly approaching project the NZTA are going to hold a few open days – note: these aren’t consultation, more just “here’s what we’re building”.
Come along to one of our open days where you can learn more about the project and talk to the project team.
When: Saturday 14 November, 10am – 2pm
Tuesday 17 November, 4pm – 7pm
Where: Royal Road School Hall, 112 Royal Road, Massey
They say that in time for the open days, this day next they’ll update their website with designs and more information about the project.
Lastly while actual construction doesn’t start till next year the timeline the NZTA have put out suggests we’ll start seeing some physical works soon such as removing houses in the way of the widening.
The big winners from investment in high quality urban Transit are of course drivers. They benefit from all the people making the rational decision to choose other ways to get around freeing up the roads for those who need or choose to drive. The numbers choosing to make this shift depends on the quality of the alternatives, as is shown by the huge and ongoing rise in ridership in response to the upgrade of the rail network this decade. A boom in uptake that completely caught officials and transport professionals by surprise. Here is the Ministry of Transport report to the Minister as recently as October 2014:
And of course the road freight industry should understand this too; their productivity will rise with every switch from driving to alternative systems in cities. 77% of all vehicles are private cars, so enabling a reduction in private car use, especially at the peaks, is likely to be more cost effective way of speeding truckies and tradies than spending 10 of billions on more roads which simply incentivise more private driving on all roads. Especially as this spending squeezes out opportunities to invest in complementary networks. This is the contradiction at the heart of the RoNS model, especially for urban areas; using all available funds to induce more driving, because traffic is congested.
Auckland needs better alternatives to driving not alternative roads to drive on. For drivings sake.
From this morning’s Herald, Drive. Dr Anil Sharma, Porsche enthusiast:
Auckland Star April 1973. Back in the Dark Ages it was considered appropriate to near kill the patient in order to help them. In the 1970s Central government transport planners nearly succeeded in killing the Auckland City Centre through the subtle act of flattening its densest and most proximate dormitory suburbs, then cutting it off any still standing from the city, and turning city streets into motorway off ramps. The charm and glory of these multi-year campaigns are still with us today on the beautiful avenues of Hobson and Nelson Sts, the terrible road pattern and wasted landuse of Union and Cook St, and the blighted devalued areas of K Rd and Newton. And of course the violated and severing gullies themselves. The scale of this ‘surgery’ can be seen in this spread.
The accompanying text is fairly flat and informational.
It seems the desire for a Tabula Rasa, a blank slate, like those postwar planners had in Europe, was so great that we made our own ‘bombsite’.
Happily now we live in more enlightened times and the next city surgery of scale will be much more sophisticated, the City Rail link which as an incision compared to this earlier work is laparoscopic; minimal invasive surgery. No need to maim the patient. Once done no one will even see it, except for that high value resource of people flooding on to city streets not in a car looking for a parking space. And will supply at least as much capacity as the three motorways that meet at this point do today*. So the CRL will double the accessibility to the nation’s most concentrated, biggest, and highest value employment centre, and fastest growing residential area, seamlessly. After the recovery from a few precise cuts, that is.
*Show your work, as Peter always says:
CRL 24 trains per hour each way 750 per train [not crush load; that’s 1000] ~ 36k [crush 48k]
M’ways 12 lanes @2160 [1800 vehicles @1.2 occupants] per lane hour ~ 26k
Of course the buses on the Bridge land some 9000 souls currently too.
We were rightly dismayed when the previous Transport Minister vetoed the desperately needed extension of the famously successful Northern Busway as part of the big spend up on SH1 on the North Shore. We suspect NZTA were too, as they know that the Busway the single most effective tool for reducing congestion and increasing access and human happiness for the travelling public on this route. And is a vital part of the booming Rapid Transit Network. Additionally this extension surely also helps streamline the general traffic lane design through the SH1/SH18 intersection and beyond. NZTA must be keen to not have to factor in growing numbers of merging buses from shoulder lanes etc.
So we are very pleased to find that the agency has found a way to return this logical part of the project to the programme and out of the shadow of ministerial whim [presumably the change of Minister helped?]:
Here is the full document.
Bus users report that their journeys between Constellation and Albany Stations can currently take up a disproportionately large amount of the total trip because of the absence of any Transit right of way; the buses of course are not only themselves delayed but are also delaying other road users here.
The extension will not be a minor structure but as it adjacent to commercial properties it is hard to see how the usual forces of compliant will be able get much traction against it, but it will still need public support at the consultation phase, so Busway users, let yourselves be heard.
We understand the current Busway is built to a standard to enable upgrading to rail systems, we would expect this standard to be continued on this extension, as this does look like the most logical way to next cross the Waitemata Harbour.
Finally, because this is a) spending on the Shore b) not ratepayers funds, and c) not spending on a train or a bike, even the venerable George Wood will be in favour of the proposed extension.
While Auckland remains waiting on the government to commit to its share of funding for the most transformative transport project since the Harbour Bridge – the City Rail Link – the NZTA have just announced that they’ve shortlisted three groups of companies to build the Puhoi to Warkworth motorway as Public Private Partnership.
In the past the NZTA have said the project could cost around $760 million however as PPPs are just glorified hire purchase arrangements it means that over the course of the loan it will cost us considerably more than that. As an example the Transmission Gully project in Wellington costs around $1 billion however after the interest accrued during construction is capitalised it pushes up the cost to about $1.3 billion. That cost is then paid off back to the private companies which the NZTA say will likely be $120-$130 million annually.
That cost might be justified if the current road was heavily used however it isn’t and even the NZTA’s own analysis during the consent hearings admitted it was only really busy a few times over summer. Neither is it the economic saviour of Northland like the government and some other politicians claim. For starters it finishes just north of Warkworth and from there north traffic is normally around 10,000 vehicles per day. Also if this new road was really going to make a difference in connecting Northland with the rest of the country then why hasn’t the existing toll road done that, or even the extension that got the motorway to Orewa/Silverdale in the early 1990’s.
Unfortunately we’ve not been allowed to see the business case for the project as in the past when asked the NZTA they’re keeping if secret until after they’ve awarded the tender.
Here’s the press release:
The NZ Transport Agency has today taken another step towards building the new Pūhoi to Warkworth motorway by announcing the consortia shortlisted to progress to the next stage of the project.
Transport Agency Chief Executive Geoff Dangerfield says the building of the motorway is a significant step towards improving the safety, reliability and resilience of State Highway 1 between Northland and the upper North Island freight triangle of Auckland, Waikato and Tauranga.
In September 2014, a Board of Inquiry confirmed approval of the Transport Agency’s application for designation and resource consents for the project. This was followed, in May 2015, by the Cabinet approving an application by the Transport Agency to procure the motorway through a Public Private Partnership (PPP).
The Cabinet approval came after the Transport Agency determined, following an extensive business case analysis, that the project met the Treasury’s criteria to be procured as a PPP.
The consortia shortlisted to receive a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the financing, design, construction, management and maintenance of the Pūhoi to Warkworth project under a PPP are:
- Northlink – made up of Cintra Developments Australia Pty Ltd, InfraRed Infrastructure III General Partner Ltd, John Laing Investments Ltd, Ferrovial Agroman Ltd, Fulton Hogan Ltd.
- Northern Express Group – Made up of Accident Compensation Corporation, HRL Morrison & Co Public Infrastructure Partners, Acciona Concesiones S.L., Fletcher Building Ltd, Macquarie Group Holdings New Zealand Ltd, Acciona Infrastructure Australia Pty Ltd, The Fletcher Construction Company Ltd, Higgins Contractors Ltd.
- Pacific Connect – made up of Pacific Partnerships Pty Ltd, VINCI Concessions S.A.S., ACS Infrastructure Australia Pty Ltd, Aberdeen Infrastructure Investments (No.4) Ltd, Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd, HEB Construction Ltd.
Mr Dangerfield says the announcement of the shortlisted consortia comes after a rigorous evaluation and selection process.
“We are very fortunate to have such high-quality companies and organisations showing an interest in the Pūhoi to Warkworth project. All of these companies and organisations have sound experience in delivering large infrastructure projects.
“I’m confident that any of these consortia can deliver a high-quality motorway which will provide greater resilience, improved road safety and journey time reliability, and a better connection for freight, tourism and motorists.”
Mr Dangerfield says the RFP will be issued to the shortlisted consortia later this month and the Transport Agency expects to announce a Preferred Bidder by mid-2016.
Subject to successful contract negotiations with the Preferred Bidder, the PPP contract for the project is expected to be awarded in October 2016.
He says the Pūhoi to Warkworth project seeks to procure a PPP contract that would deliver a value-for-money motorway which will assist economic growth in Northland.
“A PPP contract will likely see the PPP consortium manage and maintain the motorway for the 25 years that will follow the anticipated six-year period to build it.”
“PPPs are a particularly suitable procurement method for delivering great results for large-scale and complex infrastructure.
“Using a PPP for key infrastructure projects will open the door for private sector innovations that are not always achievable under traditional public sector procurement methods.
“PPPs allow specific outcomes to be established and measured – and for risks to be identified and transferred to the private sector.
“An outcomes-based PPP for the Pūhoi to Warkworth project will also allow great flexibility within the designation to achieve optimised innovative outcomes.”
Mr Dangerfield says that under a PPP, full ownership of the motorway will always remain with the public sector.
“The nature of the contract to be used will provide a strong incentive for the successful PPP consortium to deliver the best possible results for road users.”
Tentatively, construction of the Pūhoi to Warkworth motorway, under a PPP arrangement, could possibly start in late 2016 with the road completed and open by 2022.
Mr Dangerfield says no decision has been made on tolling for the Pūhoi to Warkworth route but should the motorway be tolled, the Transport Agency would retain responsibility for tolling.
“The public would be fully consulted on any tolling proposal which must also obtain Ministerial approval,” he said.
He says the Transport Agency will continue to consider PPPs for other large-scale and complex infrastructure projects which could potentially benefit from the innovation and value-for-money that can be achieved through a PPP approach.
The first state highway in New Zealand to be delivered through a PPP is the Transmission Gully (MacKays to Linden) project in Wellington.
In July 2014, the Transport Agency signed a PPP contract with the Wellington Gateway Partnership (WGP). Work on Transmission Gully began in September last year, and the motorway will be open for traffic by 2020.
Prompted by the news that the NZTA is tendering work for route protection of the Additional Waitemata Harbour Crossing (AWHC), I initiated an OIA request to the NZTA which has now been responded to.
I requested, on behalf of the Campaign for Better Transport:
1. A statement defining the land transport problem or issue that the proposed AWHC solution is attempting to address.
2. The studies and comparative assessments of alternative solutions that the NZTA has conducted, including, but not restricted to, an electrified rail only crossing of the Waitemata Harbour between the Auckland isthmus and the North Shore.
The NZTA responded with the following PDF documents:
- Attachment A: Additional Waitemata Harbour Crossing Preliminary Business Case, January 2011. The business case includes a statement outlining the problem which the Additional Waitemata Harbour Crossing project is attempting to address (refer to ‘Description of Service Need’ on page 9)
- Attachment B: Waitemata Harbour Crossing Study Phase 1: summary report option short listing, November 2007
- Attachment C: Waitemata Harbour Crossing Study 2008: Study Summary Report, April 2008
Question 1: What Problem Are We Trying to Solve?
The Description of Service Need is this:
What stands out here is the statement that the “AHB currently provides the only direct, cross-harbour vehicle link between the CBD and the North Shore.” Resiliency seems to be a major driver behind a solution which supports six lanes of general traffic in a tunnel, with the possibility of rail at some indeterminate point in the future. What is odd is that there is no mention in any of the supplied documents of the Western Ring Route, a $2bn project adding resiliency and reducing demand on the existing Harbour Bridge which, in the NZTA’s own words, will “create a seamless motorway between Manukau and Albany”. This is due for completion in phases in the next few years.
There are also the usual predictions of increasing traffic volumes, which threaten to “adversely impact on the length and reliability of travel times”. Quite why it is vital to minimise the travel times of single occupant cars isn’t explained. Regardless, the Business Case uses traffic volumes in 2008 as the basis of forecasting, before the Northern Busway had a chance to make much of an impact.
However, as Matt pointed out in this post, traffic volumes across the bridge have stubbornly stayed at 2008 levels, at least up until 2014.
And that pretty much sums up the statement of need. As far as analysis of the need for mass rapid transit goes, there’s this analysis of the Busway:
Forecast demand for the Busway indicates that the morning peak hour flows into the CBD could increase to 250 buses per hour in 2041, representing a 138% increase over the 2009 volumes. This figure is the recommended target capacity for the Busway system, representing 12,000 passenger movements per hour6. However, achieving the target capacity is currently hindered by capacity constraints close to the CBD where the provision of dedicated bus facilities is more expensive and bus volumes are at their highest. One of the advantages of a new crossing would be the ability to have dedicated bus lanes across the AHB which would maintain a high level of trip reliability for passenger transport users.
On rail, the Business Case assumes a rail link between Gaunt Street Station in the Wynyard Quarter (underground) and Akoranga Station (at grade). The basis for modelling the tunnel is this diagram:
Construction cost alone of the combined tunnel is $4.6bn in 2010 dollars, with a total nominal cost over a 30 year period calculated as $12bn for the tunnel, including all capital expenditure and operating costs, with a risk factor as well:
The Business Case document comes up with a BCR of 0.4 for the combined tunnel option, including wider economic benefits and not including tolling. Not so much a Business Case for the proposed AWHC then, but more a massive red flag suggesting that not building the proposed tunnel is actually more economically beneficial for Auckland. Even more worryingly, even though there is an assumption that the motorway will be widened to four lanes between Esmonde and Northcote road, there doesn’t seem to be any explanation of how the capacity of the Central Motorway Junction will be increased to cope with the additional three lanes of traffic each way that a new tunnel crossing will provide for.
Incidentally, transport modelling and the Cost Benefit Analysis excluded rail (p.25)
A parallel work stream to this study — The Network Plan — undertook an assessment of the longterm capacity of the existing Busway and concluded that a rail crossing was not required within the timeframes considered for the CBA. As such, the transport modelling excluded the modelling of rail, and the CBA includes costs for the roading component of the crossings only (i.e. the cost for the rail tunnel is excluded).
There is an interesting discussion on tolling (up to $8 each way modelled), but perhaps that is best left for another post.
Question 2: What alternatives have been evaluated?
The Business Case takes it as a given that capacity for additional vehicles is required. This stems from the earlier options papers, which do indeed include an examination of a rail only crossing, which is the second question of the OIA request. Attachment C covers three short-listed options, with variations for each:
The study concludes (p.43) that a combined road / rail tunnel option is best – Option 2C.
So although a rail tunnel was the best passenger transport option, the study recommends a combined road / rail tunnel. The option evaluation process appears not to have used a CBA / Economic Evaluation Manual approach, and it is difficult to tell exactly why option 2C is favoured over a rail only crossing. There is no comparison of BCRs between the rail only and combined tunnel options. Presumably there is a strong weighting for resilience, but again discussion about the Western Ring Route is non-existent. However, the study also carries this warning on p.45:
Limited spare capacity on the strategic and regional arterial networks on both sides of the Harbour, together with the need to move towards a more sustainable transport system, mean it will be neither practical nor desirable to provide sufficient cross harbour road capacity to match demand. Any additional connectivity should therefore be provided to the best practicable standard, that is, in balance with the remainder of the Auckland road network, and in a cost effective manner.
And cost should probably be one of the most important factors. Page 36 has a table of costs for the different options.
A rail only tunnel was costed at about a quarter of the cost of a road / rail tunnel.
In summary, I don’t really think NZTA’s solution is going to work. By design, it will increase the number of single occupant cars in the CBD and surrounding motorway networks and, according to their own analysis, make the economy of Auckland worse than if the project doesn’t proceed. (And that isn’t even considering the impact of tolls on the economy.)
I don’t accept claims that the tunnel will be “future proofed” for rail either. You only need to look at the history of future-proofing in Auckland (think Te Iririrangi Drive or the Manukau Harbour Crossing) to know that most likely it will never happen.
The taxation and expenditure of over $4bn dollars could make a real difference to Auckland if it was spent on the right things. I think Aucklanders should get a say on this. Allowing the AWHC route protection to proceed in its current form, at a cost of tens of millions, is the thin edge of the wedge. If planning starts for a tunnel for single occupant cars, then that is what we’ll end up with.
This isn’t urgent. We’ve got time to get it right.
We are all having quite a bit of trouble taking all the transport institutions seriously over RTN designations and intentions. The failure for any action to have been taken over a route through Mangere and the Airport over the last decade, and the constant reductions of any available space for a rail ROW there, or at least one not prohibitively expensive, make all the assurances we hear increasingly hard to believe.
Now we are expected to have no concerns at all about a process which shows every sign of just being another massive state highway with a little pretend drawing of a train in the sump of a massive road tunnel.
Tommy Parker confirmed today that buses on the bridge are to be the RTN solution, ie what there is now.
Our view is that this puts the cart before the horse. NZTA should not be starting with a solution without any clear description of the problem. We do not see why it needs a designation over a stretch of water to analyse what may be missing across here. Although it is not the designation that is the problem, but the lack of a needs focused, creative, and open minded analysis that troubles us.
As to us it is clear that what is missing from the existing bridges is a real RTN route [assuming SkyPath happens]. Therefore we expect to see real exploration of what delivering rail only tunnels [or bridge] would do to shape demand here. A rail system would certainly be higher capacity than road tunnels, and, well planned, would also likely be much cheaper and stageable. Adjacent rail systems do add resilience as the TransBay Tunnels did in Loma Prieta earthquake of 1989 in San Francisco. And not do have all of the disbenefits of the massive increase in vehicle numbers throughout the whole city [congestion!] that more traffic lanes will.
We know than any additional road capacity here would be a total disaster for the city, which we are currently de-carring, and the CMJ which is already full, and the North Shore local roads. We also know, and NZTA almost brags about this [see below], the main outcome would be a traffic inducement on a massive scale:
This is ‘decide and provide’ in a bad way, a huge programme of traffic creation; $6 Billion to get people out of buses and into the driver’s seat. What ever we build across this route will be used; what an amazing opportunity to choose to shape both demand and the city in a wholly positive way.
However the fact that NZTA is not currently allowed to spend on rail capex, and anyway really is mainly a State Highway provider and then is not calling for any outside expertise to explore rail systems is also not encouraging:
It is our view that both a driverless Light Metro system, or a continuation of AT’s proposed Light Rail network across the Harbour, to Takapuna and up the Busway, need to be properly explored as the next possible crossing over the harbour. As they are likely to achieve all of the aims NZTA and AT are charged with delivering for the city much more completely and at a lower cost than any additional traffic lanes and without any of the disbenefits.
– the economic benefits of true spatially efficient urban transport system linking the Shore to city and the isthmus RTN
– make a massive transformational shift to public transport
– real carbon and other pollution reductions of scale from a 100% electric system
– huge place benefits, including a real reduction in city car and bus numbers
– no additional massive costs on approach roads
– resilience of additional systems as well as route
We would like to meet with NZTA at the highest level to discuss this further.
We are extremely concerned that institutional momentum is building for a very very poor outcome for the city and country and are determined to improve this process.
We look forward to your reply,
Last week the latest iteration of the National Land Transport Programme was announced. This is largely a business as usual plan, dominated by the big spend on a few massive state highways projects. However there are a few things to be celebrated, especially for cycling, and even more in the language and thinking in the supporting documents. This was repeated at the launch too, especially in the words of NZTA CEO and AT Board representative Geoff Dangerfield, and NZTA Auckland/Northland Regional Director Ernst Zöllner.
The high level aims are all strong and commendable. The focus on ‘economic growth and productivity, safety, and value for money’ are incontestably valuable. If they were to add ‘resilience, energy security, and environmental performance’ it would probably be a perfect list. But of course this is really set by the Government Policy Statement.
Dangerfield was his usual clear and persuasive self, setting a high level context and skilfully bating away questions. Zöllner was particularly articulate about both the dynamic nature of the situation in Auckland and the unformed quality of Auckland’s PT networks; especially the incomplete nature of the core Rapid Transit Network. Both noted the strong growth of PT ridership numbers, which will see a rise in the PT opex spend.
Here’s what the agency says about the Transit and Active modes, in the Providing Transport Choices document:
All incontestable good sense, and exactly the sort of points regular readers here would recognise, especially the emphasis on the value of the high quality own-right-of-way Congestion Free networks of rail and dedicated busways.
People using public transport on high-quality public transport services with a dedicated right of way, like the Auckland Northern Busway or metropolitan rail networks, can now enjoy fast, efficient journeys on comfortable modern buses and electric trains, while freeing up road space for other people and freight.
There remains, however, some considerable daylight between this analysis and the actual projects being funded. This is especially the case with the comparatively tiny sum of $176m for Public Transport Capital Works in Auckland out of a total $4.2 billion spend over the three year period in the region [~4%] and $13.9 billion nationally. This sum [half of which is from the Council’s Transport Levy] will bring much vital kit, like the Otahuhu, Manukau City, and Te Atatu bus interchanges. But is a long way from fixing those big gaps in the RTN network. In response to my questions on this they quite reasonably countered that some funding for bus capex is in other budgets, notably under the AMETI programme, as part of the North Western massive highway works, and the Northern Busway extensions.
However the two Busway sums do not result in the construction of even one metre of additional RTN. For the Northern Busway the previous minister deleted construction of the proposed extension from the accelerated motorway package [a loan to be met from future NLTF], so all we are left with is ‘future proofing’ and no one can ride on a busway that has only been future proofed for. On the Northwestern we do get the improvement of bus shoulder lanes and a station at Te Atatu; but no RTN. AMETI is the best of the bunch, but that’s only if the proposed BRT does happen instead of the place-ruining flyover that appeals more to some entitled voices there.
Then we come to the great problem that the National Land Transport Fund is barred from investing in rail infrastructure yet Auckland is now showing the huge value of using this separate network for moving increasing numbers of people completely outside of traffic congestion. And some RTN routes are clearly best served by rail. Just as well the Council has the courage to just get on with the CRL first stage by itself so at least this vital gap at the heart of the RTN is getting a start.
The case for near term investment in PT and especially for completing the RTN can be summarised thus:
- current demand growth of 20+% on Auckland’s Rapid Transit Network,
- the RTN is showing improved operating cost effectiveness as it grows,
- the strongly voiced value the agency sees in quality PT networks especially their positive effects on traffic congestion and economic growth,
- the well known relationship between what is invested in and what then grows in use plus the positive externalities of increased PT use,
- and the observed sub-optimal nature of the city’s current PT networks in both quality and extent, ie the clear opportunities for improvement.
So despite the good work being undertaken by many in all our transport agencies: NZTA, AT, and MoT, there seem to be structural problems that are leading to important opportunities
being missed in our only city of scale
. It is this context that I wrote to NZTA Auckland and Northland Director Ernst Zöllner with concerns about two specific projects that embody these issues. As this post is already quite long I will run the letter tomorrow morning in a follow-up post…