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By admin, on May 20th, 2009 For now I am just going to add weight to the Campaign for Better Transport’s “Action Stations” campaign:
The Campaign for Better Transport today launched a campaign to highlight uncertainty surrounding the future of public transport projects in Auckland.
Join the campaign here.
Launched today at the Mt Albert railway station, the aim of the “Action Stations” campaign is to gain assurance from central Government that funding for a range of public transport initiatives such as integrated ticketing, new stations, ferry terminals, Onehunga rail and electric trains will proceed as originally intended before the withdrawal of the regional fuel tax.
The Auckland Regional Transport Agency (ARTA), which oversees public transport improvements in Auckland, has now been forced by central Government to apply for funding from the New Zealand Transport Agency for the funding of railway stations for Onehunga and other projects.
Campaign organiser Dr. Francis Reid encouraged the public to participate in the Action Stations campaign by sending key transport decision makers a postcard, which can be downloaded from the bettertransport.org.nz website.
“These projects need to be completed. The Government appointed Auckland council transition agency is threatening to delay all of these projects even further,” says Dr Reid.
Ancient tracks on the Onehunga branch line have now been replaced, but the location of passenger rail stations and how they are to be funded has yet to be determined.
“The withdrawal of $200m worth of funding through the regional fuel tax has left a gaping hole in Auckland public transport funding”, said Campaign for Better Transport Convenor Cameron Pitches.
“The ridiculous thing is the Government said they did so out of concern about rising petrol prices hurting people the pocket, but in the meantime petrol companies have increased the price by 5c a litre anyhow.”
Mr Pitches also spoke of the “deeply depressing” news that the Government had confirmed that it will slash up to $250m from public transport infrastructure spending over the next three years in order to boost expenditure on new state highways.
Total expenditure on new state highways is now set to be 22 times that of public transport infrastructure over the next three years, a multiple that Mr Pitches describes as “astonishing underinvestment, given the record 20% growth in Auckland’s public transport we have consistently seen year on year.”
“The Government is putting all of its eggs into one basket. Putting $3bn dollars into new highways which have not been assessed yet for their costs and benefits is extremely risky. If the price of oil increases again, it will look like an incredibly foolish strategy.”
“Central Government just doesn’t get it”, concludes Mr Pitches. “Aucklanders want more investment in public transport in Auckland, not more and more roads that only encourage more and more single occupant cars.”
By admin, on May 19th, 2009 I am sure the 1960s were great – good music, free love and all. However, it is disappointing to see the direction in which the Ministry of Transport’s government policy statement is taking transport in New Zealand. Someone should tell Steven Joyce that the 60s were 40 odd years ago now and the world has moved on! The updated Government Policy Statement sets the scene for the allocation of funds for transport, and has been changed quite significantly from the direction in which the previous government was taking it. Steven Joyce confirms that it basically entails shifting money from public transport, walking, cycling, roads maintenance and local roads all into state highways. In fact, state highways get a billion dollars extra over the next three years – with almost half of that money being “reallocated” (ie. stolen from) other areas of transport funding (ie. everything except building state highways).
The GPS confirms that it’s going to be a roadsfest – at the expense of everything else:
The Government Policy Statement on Land Transport Funding (GPS) is the main guiding document by which the government can ensure that the land transport funding system focuses on the priority of generating economic growth and productivity. The GPS aligns investment in the land transport sector more closely with this priority. Further, the GPS closely reflects the modal choices that are realistically available to New Zealanders. Approximately 70 percent of all freight in New Zealand goes by road, and 84 percent of people go to work by car, truck or motorbike, so we need good roads to move freight and people. The government supports some mode shift over time, especially in our major cities of Wellington, Auckland and Christchurch, but considers that this should not be accelerated to the point where the outcomes are economically inefficient.
As I explained in a previous post, the 84% argument that Steven Joyce uses is completely stupid. Of course most people in New Zealand drive their cars as they have no other choice, but in any case what currently happens is irrelevant when it comes to deciding what future projects should be funded. What matters is projected what will happen in the future and doing your best to ensure that future transportation spending reflects what – at best estimate – will happen in the future. If that wasn’t the case then television makers around the world would abandon LCD and plasma screen TVs and build masses of older CRT ones. Of course that’s a silly proposal, just like this government’s transport direction.
The whole GPS document is incredibly depressing reading actually – it’s like something from the 1960s that envisages a future where oil will forever be cheap and plentiful, there is no congestion that we can’t build our way out of, and climate change is something nobody’s even heard of yet. At a time when the Regional Council is being so forward thinking in their approach to transport, the utter stupidity and backwards thinking of the GPS becomes all the more obvious.
The table below shows the spending for the first three years, and clearly highlights how unbalanced the GPS is:
Steven Joyce needs to wake up and realise that it’s 2009 and not 1959. I see some irony in the New Zealand Herald’s listing of stories:
By admin, on May 19th, 2009 Following on from yesterday’s post about a possible future Metro system for Auckland, I had an interseting chat with Jose Barbosa on bFM today.
The link to the interview mp3 is here.
By admin, on May 18th, 2009 The Auckland Regional Transport Committee’s latest meeting agenda takes particular interest in the progress of the Regional Land Transport Strategy (RLTS), which is being reviewed and updated. Such a review cannot occur quickly enough, in my opinion, as the 2005 RLTS is a roads-centric piece of rubbish. I guess that might be slightly harsh on that document, as it did represent quite a shift away from the EVEN MORE roads centric strategies that precded it, but it still looked to spend at least twice as much on road transport funding as it did on public transport.
The new RLTS sets a long-term strategic position that appears likely to be the kind of quantum shift away from 20th century roads-centric transport funding that is so essential for Auckland. I won’t bore everyone with the details (in fact, I still need to read through them myself to understand whether this will actually turn out to be as good as it sounds – often there’s a huge disconnect between words and actions when it come to transport) but it does seem like a sensible range of options for the strategic direction of transportation in Auckland are being presented. One of the biggest issues with the previous RLTS was that it only looked at a range of transport funding options that already presumed that roads would get the bulk of funds. In the end, the ARC did go with the most public-transport friendly option, but even that was just a roads-fest. So it is good to see the options now being presented offer a real choice.
- Strategic Option 1 – Demand Management: Heavy use of factors which push people away from motor vehicle use (including road pricing) towards use of public transport (PT), walking and cycling. This would need to be supported by improvements to PT and walking and cycling to accommodate the diverted demand.
- Strategic Option 2 – Mixed Investment: Continuation of the current strategy of improvement in all modes, with some shift away from road investment.
- Strategic Option 3 – Change led by Public Transport (PT) Improvements: Heavy investment in PT infrastructure and services in order to ‘pull’ people from cars to PT, but some investment in roading.
- Strategic Option 4 – Quantum Shift: A combination of the “push” factors from Strategic Option 1 (congestion pricing and parking measures) with the “pull” factors of Strategic Option 3 together with a “what if” land use designed to maximise the opportunities for public transport, walking and cycling.
The following table details various aspects of the four options further:
Now let’s have a look at what public transport improvements are envisaged for these options:
So option one includes a reasonable upgrade to the public transport system. In particular, it identifies that if we push people out of their cars (likely with peak oil coming soon anyway) then the CBD rail tunnel is a critical project to deal with patronage increases.
This option is fairly similar to option 1 above, but also includes quite a range of roading improvements that I haven’t included.
Metro…. metro… METRO!!!! Holy heck this option sounds pretty awesome. A metro line from Massey Uni, through the CBD and then under Dominion Road. Sure it would cost billions but it would be fantastic for Auckland.
Option 4 includes the same public transport projects as option three – but also with the added push factors that would accompany option 1. So what are those push factors?
Road pricing is a very controversial issue, and I generally am only supportive of it when there are great public transport alternatives. However, I do note that peak oil will impose a form of road pricing itself – as petrol increases rapidly in price. So even if we don’t embark on a deliberate process of road pricing I still think that we will end up with many of its effects.
I am very supportive of these ideas. The provision of free parking is one of the biggest hidden subsidies given to the private car. When we go to a shopping mall everything we buy is more expensive because the mall has to provide a huge amount of free parking. That means if someone walks, cycles or catches the bus to the mall then they are subsidising those who drive – pretty unfair as walkers, cyclists and bus riders are usually the young, old and poor. As Auckland intensifies there will be increasing pressure on land value and it just won’t make economic sense to provide so much parking anymore. So therefore I think that it is very likely to have much more parking regulation in the future.
So, overall I am a big fan of “Strategic Option 4 – Quantum Shift”. It includes the fantastic public transport improvements outlined in Option 3 as well as the push factors of option 1 that I think will happen anyway. The significant change in land-use patterns that Option 4 envisages are somewhat already underway in the future planning framework Auckland City Council is putting together at the moment.
Bring on the quantum shift – finally Auckland looks like it might end up with a half-decent Regional Land Transport Strategy!
By admin, on May 16th, 2009 Whilst it seems government has settled on its prefered option for the Waterview Connection, there is still a lot that will take place before we start to see diggers out and around Mt Albert and Waterview. Well, at least I would hope that a lot would need to take place before beginning such a huge and expensive project – so that the community has proper environmental mitigation and so that we actually know that spending $1.4 billion on this project is worth it. I’m not convinved that either will happen.
Let’s start with the economic justification of the project. The cost-benefit analysis for the previous option – the full tunnel – was briefly outlined in the Ministry of Transport’s review of that option. The figures were fairly dodgy in my opinion, largely because 73% of the benefits are mythical time-savings benefits. Now one would imagine that many of the costs and benefits are the same for this option as the previous option, in particular the benefits. However, surely there will be greater social and enviornmental costs associated with the partial tunnel and surface option than would have been the case for the full tunnel option. It would certainly be interesting to see the reworked figures. The construction costs are most certainly lower, which I guess is a good thing, but it seems like we’re just being told to believe that this outweighs any social, environmental or economic (like the loss in house values for people surrounding the project but not directly affected by it) costs that will increase. I would certainly like some pressure put on Steven Joyce to show us the updating cost-benefit analysis, and also to show how the $2.62 billion of time savings benefits are calculated.
The second issue I have is related to the consenting process for the Waterview Connection. To briefly go into a bit of “planner speak”, consenting the Waterview Connection will take place by way of a designation. A designation is a kind of “spot zoning” which identifies specific controls, rules and restrictions that are placed on an area of land. Designations cannot be made by anyone, only certified “requiring authorities” such as government ministers, infrastructure providers and councils. Designations are used for schools, roads, power-lines, railway lines and motorways. A designation also allows the Public Works Act 1940 to come into play, which relates to the compulsory acquisition of property (with appropriate compensation of course). In reality, designations generally work fairly similar to resource consents these days when it comes to their processing – although less consideration of the council’s District Plan is given and more consideration is given to the analysis of the project’s environmental effects.
The application for a designation is a “Notice of Requirement”, similar to a resource consent application in some ways but also different in some important ways. The Notice of Requirement, as well as proposing restrictions on the activity and assessing its environmental effects, must also explicitly state why the designation is necessary and must assess possible alternatives to this particular designation. These can be alternative routes, methods or processes that might otherwise achieve the stated purpose of the designation. With regards to the processing and decision-making on a designation the main difference between one and a resource consent is that a council, at the moment, can only recommend alterations to the designation. The requiring authority can reject or accept these recommendations – although of course either party can appeal to the environment court. Large projects that are controversial (like Waterview) generally end up in the environment court – so it can be a pretty long and drawn out process. However, that does not mean it is a pointless process. Many projects have been significantly improved by the consenting process – with the following coming to mind in recent years:
1) The SH20 Mt Roskill Extension had its impacts on Mt Roskill mountain significantly reduced.
2) The Onehunga interchange portion of the Manukau Harbour Crossing Project was removed due to its effects on volcanic cones and the views of the Manukau Harbour.
There are many other similar examples where public submissions really have ended up making a difference to the outcome of a designation process. Some of these changes have been made at the hearings stage (like the Onehunga case) while others have been made in the course of an environment court appeal. However, in general the input of the public has resulted in a superior outcome.
So therefore I am worried about what effects the current proposed changes to the Resource Management Act will have on the ability of the public to make a difference when it comes to the Waterview Connection. These concerns began when Steven Joyce made the following statement:
Depending on the final scope of the project it could be possible to begin construction in 2011 and complete the project within about four years. As a Road of National Significance this is expected to be progressed under the call-in process of the new provisions of the Resource Management Act which will significantly speed up delivery of the project.
So what are those “new provisions” and how will they limit things? Well this is what Nick Smith had to say when doing the first reading of the RMA Amendment Bill:
The first tranche of reforms deals with projects of national significance. There are real problems in how long it takes to get major infrastructure projects through under the consenting process, particularly as they have to go through a local consenting process and, inevitably, end up at the Environment Court. We need only look at examples—such as the Albany to Pūhoi realignment B2 (ALPURT B2) in Auckland, which took nearly a decade, and the Wellington City bypass, which took 17 years—to see the need for reform.The tricky balance we need to recognise is that these projects have both a local and a national dimension to them. It is a gross simplification to say they are all either national or local. That is why this bill takes an innovative approach in creating a single board of inquiry, but with the capacity of local authorities to nominate board members on to those boards, and also an amendment to ensure that local knowledge is an important factor. The bill provides for a single-step process that recognises both the local and national dimensions of projects.
The boards will be chaired by a current or retired Environment Court judge to ensure independence. There are tight timelines of 9 months for reaching a decision, and restrained appeal rights, to ensure that we can build important infrastructure for our country.
To paraphrase, no local council hearing, a strict 9 month time limit on the consent process and limited rights of appeal. Ouch! Whatever happened to the government feeling bad for the poor people of Waterview and Mt Albert over this decision? Not only does the government plan to build a (completely unnecessary, by the way) motorway right through a well established part of Auckland’s urban area, they also don’t want to let anyone properly oppose it.
I think the first thing local residents being “consulted” by NZTA over this issue should do is demand that this project is not included as one that would go straight to a board of inquiry. The residents should demand that this issue is not hurried through to the extent that their voices are silenced and they should demand that their rights of appeal are not restrained. This is a critical first step – local hearings do achieve change but a board of inquiry is, in my opinion, just a rubber stamp. Even if the proposal cannot be fully stopped, a local hearing would ensure that the best possible mitigation occurs for affected residents – something that I do not believe will be possible if the project comes within the grasp of the RMA Amendments.
By admin, on May 15th, 2009 The details of the government’s decision to press ahead with a Super-City for Auckland are starting to emerge. It will be done in three separate Acts of Parliament.The first one, which is currently going through parliament under urgency (which means no public consultation) sets up the Auckland Council as a legal entity and also sets a date (November 1 next year) when the existing eight councils in Auckland will be dis-established. This first Act, once passed, will also establish a Transition Board to guide the restructuring of local government in Auckland over the next 18 months – so that once we do have elections in October next year we’ll actually have a functioning council structure beneath the politicians. Obviously that is important work.
I do have some issues with this first bill though. To start with, passing significant legislation under urgency is quite an anti-democratic step. The first bill may not seem like much – in that it doesn’t set out the structure of the future Auckland Council, what it will have power over and what the local boards will have power over – but what it does do is predicate that we will end up with a single Auckland Council and that the existing local bodies will be dissolved in November next year. Now, as I have said before I am a fan of a Super City, but with this approach it seems like we’re putting the cart before the horse – deciding the outcome of the more detailed bills to come before we’ve actually gone through the process of finalising what they’ll look like. What if public submissions on the details of a Super-City point out its flaws so well that we need to reconsider whether to establish one at all? The problem is that by then it will be too late to do so. The other issue I have is the enormous power the Transition Board is going to have, and also their lack of oversight. Any council spending of more than $20,000 will need their sign off, yet this super-powerful board will be pretty much accountable to nobody. What if they are of a political bent to not want councils to do anything much at all for the next 18 months?
Anyway, annoying as it is that the first stage of Auckland’s local government reorganisation is proceeding with these flaws, what is done is done. Therefore, in some respects we should focus on the second bill, which will define the structure of the council and also the local boards. This is where my biggest two issues are:
- I do not think there should be any ‘at large’ councillors. This is for a number of reasons. Firstly, it will cause confusion for people voting in local government elections as one will need to choose eight people out of a list of potentially 40 or 50. Already when it comes to local elections (especially for community boards and District Health Boards) some of the voting can take on an “eeney meeney miney mo” appearance. Having to choose eight people while reading through 40 or 50 different candidates and their blurbs seems insane and will put people off voting in local body elections even more, or worse make them just vote randomly. Secondly, as ‘at large’ councillors will have to spend an awfully large amount of money to campaign to their entire electorate (the whole of Auckland) only those who are rich will get their message across – this will lead to an imbalance towards richer politicians and inevitably to the right-wing of politics.
- I think that the local boards need real power. Whilst infighting between councils is one of the main reasons having a Super City would be a good idea, it is worrying to see that these local boards appear to have little – if any – actual statutory power. It appears as though they will have their powers set by the Auckland Council and be not much more than a lobby group.
It will be important for people to understand what this bill means for Auckland, and to look at ways in which it could be amended for the Super City to be done better. Over the next few weeks I will be putting together my submission on this bill and I will share my thoughts on ways I think it can be improved. The third bill will involve more detail about how the Super City will operate (rather than how it’s structured). Importantly, it will include information about the Regional Transport Authority.
Suggestions are most welcome about ways in which you think the Super City bill could be improved.
By admin, on May 14th, 2009 I do promise that I’ll post on things other than the Waterview Connection eventually, but at the moment it is clearly the most controversial and popular transport topic of discussion in Auckland. So I do feel obliged to explore it properly. Furthermore, I do want to take the opportunity to share a bit more of my opinion, and also my concerns on the matter. But for a start let’s have a look at a map showing exactly where the Waterview Connection proposal will run:
http://maps.google.com/maps?f=q&source=embed&hl=en&geocode=&q=http:%2F%2Fsplash.labour.org.nz%2Fwaterview_nat.kmz&ie=UTF8&t=k&ll=-36.887859,174.712486&spn=0.048809,0.077076&z=14
It would seem that most of the extra 240 houses that will need to be demolished are in two places:
Firstly, in between the deep tunnel under Avondale Heights and the cut and cover tunnel underneath Great North Road there is proposed to be a short area of surface level motorway. When I first saw this I wondered why, and now I realise that it’s to create an area of ventilation for the tunnels – which means that a huge concentration of vehicle exhaust fumes will be coming out of this part:
 The dark blue is surface level and the light-blue is cut and cover. Clearly, houses above both areas will need to go. However, I’d be more concerned if I lived in areas around those directly affected – as they will have a noisy motorway and vehicle emissions to contend with. In a way those who lose their whole house are the lucky ones – those who now have a motorway over the back fence are the unlucky ones. And under the Public Works Act, unless they are directly affected (ie. land taken) then they don’t get compensation, even if their house values decline.
The second area where bulldozing houses will be necessary is between Hendon Ave and Alan Wood Reserve:
Now, once again if the route goes through your house in some ways you’re the lucky one. NZTA will purchase those houses at market value and the people will be able to find a place to live elsewhere. There are sob-stories about people living in the same place for decades and yes that is very sad, but in an economic sense they will be fairly compensated. However, the ‘money saved’ by this cheaper option is really coming at the expense of the property values of those in the surrounding area who will not be eligible for compensation under the Public Works Act. This will include the remaining properties on the southern side of Hendon Ave, properties on Bollard Ave and Methuen Road – who will have a motorway instead of a park over their back fence, and also some of the properties on Great North Road and Blockhouse Bay Road that won’t be quite within the desigation area but will still be hugely affected by the motorway.
Bizarrely, effects on property values are not considered in a cost-benefit analysis. If they were, I imagine it would be rather more difficult to get roading projects built. Think of it this way: around 360 properties are going to be directly affected and therefore bought out by NZTA. However, the number of properties that will be in some way affected by this proposal is far larger – perhaps up to ten times as many. If the effect on the values of the wider affected properties results in an average loss of value of $100,000 then that would be around $360 million of costs that the community will have to wear in order for this option to be built. Why isn’t this part of a robust cost-benefit analysis? My cynical side wonders whether it is because such an analysis would result in public transport projects doing better, as they generally have a positive effect on property values. the Ministry of Transport just couldn’t have that now, could they?
There is another aspect of this proposal that greatly worries me, and that is its effects upon the designated Avondale-Southdown Railway Corridor. This railway link has been designated since the 1940s, and while its cross-town nature means that it’s unlikely to be one of Auckland’s most popular passenger train routes, it may be an essential north-south freight link in the future. Freight trains currently have to run via Newmarket if they want to go from the north to the south, and as passenger train frequencies increase in the future it will become increasingly difficult to fit in freight trains. Therefore, for the long-term benefit of Auckland’s rail system it is imperative to keep this rail corridor available.
However, NZTA plans through the Alan Wood Reserve (which is largely designated as a rail corridor) indicate that the rail designation is going to be sacrificed. The map below shows the railway designation (the shaded area). Comparing that to the maps above it’s obvious that the motorway will go on land that is currently designated for rail:
 The NZTA diagrams show how they anticipate to be able to fit both the motorway and the railway line between the motorway and any houses along the southern side of Hendon Ave, but critically I think that the new railway corridor will be outside its existing designation area – which will in the long run make it far more difficult for Ontrack to ever re-designate the land in order to build the Avondale Southdown railway link. Effectively, NZTA are screwing Ontrack out of their designation and making it much much harder for Ontrack to ever be able to complete the Avondale Southdown line. Of course, Ontrack would have the right to tell NZTA to bugger off out of their designation – but as both organisations have Steven Joyce as their Minister I imagine the hard word went on Ontrack to give their OK. The typical cross-section of Alan Wood Reserve is shown below:
 As the above diagram shows, the 25m rail corridor goes through the houses. But that won’t be NZTA’s problem, that will be Ontrack’s problem in the future.
Just another example of public transport being screwed.
By admin, on May 13th, 2009 It was obvious (after yesterday) that the government would end up choosing their “least bad” option for the Waterview Connection. The NZTA has released its prefered option, which involves a surface level motorway between where the Mt Roskill extension to SH20 ends and New North Road (going right through Alan Wood Reserve). The motorway will then go in a tunnel underneath New North Road and Avondale Heights (cut & cover tunnel I guess?) and then after that will run seemingly directly underneath Great North Road.
Clearly, this could be worse. It seems like Phyllis Street Reserve and the Oakley Waterfall are probably safe. However, Alan Wood Reserve will be gone, and replaced by up to a 6 lane motorway. Furthermore, building a motorway directly underneath the Waterview straight stretch of Great North Road. I’m no civil engineer, but I imagine building a motorway underneath one of Auckland’s busiest arterial routes might be a little problematic.
I also still can’t figure out how this proposal, which is supposedly 60% tunnelled, is $300 million cheaper than the “Open Cut” option that NZTA costed at $1.456 billion. Were NZTA just stupid in their original costings?
More info here: http://www.transit.govt.nz/projects/waterviewconnection/resources/pdf/Waterview%20presentation%2013%20May_1.pdf
By admin, on May 13th, 2009 Steven Joyce really is beginning to annoy me as Transport Minister. Not only has he trodden all over the people of Mt Albert and Waterview, in deciding to can the Waterview tunnel, but he lives in a bizarre dreamland where he thinks that funding for future transport projects should be dependent upon the current amount of people using a particular type of transport method, rather than the future trends of where the split in transport modes is going.
Now this should be a simple issue, but clearly there’s a complexity in people’s heads that enables Steven Joyce to hide behind his answer of “84% (or sometimes 86%, depending on how he feels) of Aucklanders use private cars to get to work, so that’s where most transport funding should be doing”. To clarify, I accept that most people use cars to get to work, and to get around Auckland – that’s not debated. And in fact, it’s not really surprising considering that probably around 84% (if not more) of the current transport network is pretty much dedicated to cars. The railway lines, the Northern Busway and the various bus lanes across Auckland could be considered as the only current parts of the transport system to not be dedicated to private vehicles. However, when it comes to transport funding what we’re talking about are projects for the future, not projects for the past.
I feel that a metaphor is necessary here for this to make sense. Let’s say that I run a company which sells two different products: red socks and blue socks, for example. 84% of what I sell are red socks and 16% of what I sell are blue socks. Therefore, 84% of my current machinery is dedicated to making red socks and 16% dedicated to making blue socks. Now, over the past few years my sales of red socks have been pretty constant, in fact they haven’t increased since 2004. Over that same time period my sales of blue socks have increased significantly – by around 20-30% even. Furthermore, I know that 5-10 years into the future my main ingredient for making red socks is going to increase dramatically in price, and my prices will need to go up significantly to reflect this. Therefore my likely future sales of red socks are going to stay constant or perhaps even decline. As people will still need to buy socks, blue socks will become comparatively cheaper and more popular.
Now, a few questions:
- Over the next 5-10 years is it more likely that my sales of blue socks will increase, or my sales of red socks?
- Given that my sales of red socks haven’t increased since 2004 and because I’m mindful of future price increases in a very important ingredient, should I build another machine that makes red socks?
- Given the recent increase in my sales of blue socks, should I add capacity to the production of them instead?
- Would it be wise, in a business sense, for me to focus the vast majority of the money I have to spend on capacity increases on red socks?
In case anyone got lost in the metaphor, private vehicles are red socks, public transport is blue socks. Steven Joyce is proposing to spend the vast majority of transport funds for new infrastructure on roads, even though the number of vehicles using the roads is not increasing. Meanwhile, our “growth sector” of blue socks/public transport is getting ignored and deprived of necessary funds.
Geez I thought this guy was a successful businessman. He sounds like numbskull to me.
By admin, on May 12th, 2009 Well the wait seems largely over, although tomorrow we will find out some more details. I shall quote the press release in full:
Affordable options available for Waterview Connection Transport Minister Steven Joyce says the NZ Transport Agency has identified more cost-effective options for the completion of Auckland’s Western Ring Route, meaning the previous government’s expensive debt-funded twin tunnel option will not go ahead.In January the Minister asked officials to investigate alternative options for building the Waterview Connection after a business case prepared for the previous government released in December showed the total cost of the project would be $2.77 billion.The $2.77 billion figure was made up of $1.98 billion for construction of the tunnels, $240 million for associated work on State Highway 16 and $550 million for finance costs during the project construction period.”The NZ Transport Agency has reviewed all options and has found that the Waterview Connection, together with the same amount of associated work on State Highway 16, can be built for considerably less, at an expected cost of between $1 billion and $1.4 billion, depending which of the options is taken,” says Mr Joyce.
“Given these numbers and the increased government commitment to state highway investment through the National Land Transport Fund, the government now anticipates the Waterview project being built using the fund. This means it won’t be financed by borrowing, as envisaged by the previous government.
“In addition, all of the options being considered by the NZ Transport Agency would be built with wide enough shoulders to allow for easy widening to three lanes in each direction.
“An appropriate comparison, therefore, is between the top cost of $1.4 billion and the $3.16 billion price of the previous government’s twin three lane tunnel option.
“The NZ Transport Agency’s Board is meeting today to consider the three alternative options and will announce its preference tomorrow, once it has had the opportunity to make first contact with those directly affected.
“A thorough consultation process on the form of the selected option will then commence before a final decision is made.”
Mr Joyce says he is sorry the people of Waterview face further uncertainty while the design of the road is decided.
“I am working with the NZ Transport Agency to provide certainty as soon as possible.
“My preference is for a Waterview Connection that can be delivered at a fair price to the country with minimal ongoing impact on the community.”
The Waterview Connection is part of one of the seven Roads of National Significance the government has singled out as essential routes that require priority treatment. It is the last link to complete the Western Ring Route, linking Manukau, Auckland, Waitakere and North Shore while bypassing State highway 1 and the Auckland Harbour Bridge.
Given that the $290 million upgrade of SH16 is INCLUDED in this price of $1-1.4 billion, it means that we have somewhere between $710 million and $1.11 billion left for the cost of the motorway. Given that the NZTA had costed a four-lane “Open Cut” option at $1.456 billion for construction alone, it really makes me wonder where these extra savings are being found. The $1.456 billion open cut option I suspect would have placed the motorway in some sort of trench, so that the noise & visual effects of it were lessened. That was the cheapest and nastiest option that NZTA were previously considering, but obviously Joyce wanted them to go cheaper and nastier so we have something cheaper and nastier. Will they just bulldoze the Oakley Creek waterfall rather than going around it? Will they just bulldoze through more houses rather than tunnelling under (or going over) the New North Road pinch point?
You can’t just get more for less, there has to be a cost. And I am certain that will be the social and environmental costs of this choice.
The map below shows the options now, with the blue line showing a potential more southerly route. Lots of property affected, lots of parkland affected….
Update: more information is available in an NZ Herald article. Of particular interest are a couple of things:
- Mr Joyce said the path of the three different routes were different, but they all broadly followed the current Waterview alignment. Mr Joyce said the lowest cost option was all above ground and the other two options had varying levels of “undergrounding, either by tunnelling or using cut and cover methods”.
- The consent process would be fast tracked and limited to nine months.
The first is potentially good news, although I can’t imagine you get much tunnel for $1.1 billion. The second is terrible news, as fast-tracking always means taking away the right of someone to have their voice heard.
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